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constitutes a pro￿table option, although ￿rms also possess the incentive to sequence their
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1. Introduction
Research agreements among ￿rms competing in the same markets have since long become
a fairly widespread form of industrial cooperation. Many countries have set up cooperative
R&D programmes for some well de￿ned research areas, both at a national and at an inter-
national level. The US, for example, has created in the mid-1980s the National Cooperative
Research Act (NCRA) which aims to protect and regulate R&D cooperation among ￿rms.
Also the EU encourages and subsidizes R&D cooperation between participants belonging
to EU countries with initiatives aimed at enhancing inter-￿rm research cooperation, such
as the Eureka and EU Framework Programmes. Important research agreements go back
to the early eighties, such as the Microelectronics and Computer Technology Corporation
(MCC), formed in 1982 to conduct research related to information technology, and the Bell
Communications Research created in 1984 by seven regional US telephone companies.
The economic literature provides a strong empirical evidence on the existence of such
arrangements also in more recent years, and the analysis of the e⁄ects of cooperation on
innovation and social welfare has emerged as an important research topic. A clear under-
standing of this phenomenon is indeed crucial for consideration of technology and industrial
policies.
As is well known, a research agreement is an alliance between ￿rms in order to coordinate
their research and development activities in a joint project, and to share, to some established
degree, the knowledge obtained from this common e⁄ort. Therefore, the creation of such
research agreements allows the ￿rms not only to coordinate their research e⁄orts but also to
improve information-sharing. Many reasons may push ￿rms to form research cartels. First,
innovation is expensive, and the possibility of cost sharing and avoidance of duplication can
strongly cut the expenses to each member. Second, the risk for a ￿rm that its own innova-
tion programmes will not produce valuable results is reduced since a research agreement has
greater possibilities of diversi￿cation and each member can share risks with the other mem-
bers. Third, the members of a research alliance can acquire a great competitive advantage
over nonmembers, which implies that there can be a strong danger in being left out of such
cartels (see on this topic, Baumol 1992; see also Katz and Ordover 1990, Hernan, Marin
and Siotis 2003, and Alonso and Marin 2004 for interesting empirical studies). Research
coalitions may also have socially bene￿cial e⁄ects, such as the internalization of technologi-
cal spillovers, which in general produces an increase in the aggregate level of R&D, and the
elimination of duplication e⁄orts, which clearly leads to a reduction in research expenditures.
Departing from d￿ Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988) pioneering work, a number of papers
have analyzed the e⁄ects of research alliance in models with endogenous R&D (see, among
others, Katz and Ordover 1990, Suzumura 1992, Petit and Tolwinski 1999). However, in
these models, the creation of research agreements is exogenously assumed.
More recently, the endogenous coalition formation literature has attempted to endogenize
the formation of R&D cartels by applying noncooperative models of coalition formation (see
Bloch 2003 and 2004, Yi and Shin 2000 and Yi 2003). Usually, in these models, at a ￿rst
stage R&D coalitions are assumed to set their investment to maximize the joint pro￿ts of
￿rms participating to the agreement, and at a second stage ￿rms compete individually in the
product market. A crucial aspect to assess the stability of a given structure of agreements
among ￿rms is the sign of the externalities of R&D investments which, in turn, depend on the
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underinvestment in R&D, since through the agreement the externalities due to the nature of
public good of the R&D investment are internalized. Thus, alliances of ￿rms can invests more
than small groups, reducing the incentive to free-ride. Di⁄erent R&D alliance formation rules
may yield di⁄erent outcomes in terms of stability of cooperation (see, for instance, Yi & Shin
2000). It has been shown that, in some cases, the whole industry alliance of ￿rms investing in
R&D, when e¢ cient, tends to be stable, especially if after breaking the agreement, all ￿rms
would end up investing as singletons. However, the stability of such industry agreements is
no longer guaranteed if ￿rms can decide endogenously their timing of action.
The endogenous-timing approach was ￿rst introduced by Hamilton and Slutsky￿ s (1990)
for the case of a duopoly game. In their extensive game with observable delay, the authors
describe a two stage set-up in which, at a preplay stage, two players (duopolists) decide
independently whether to move early or late in the basic game (e.g., a duopoly quantity
game). If both players announce the same timing, that is (early, early) or (late, late), the
basic game is played simultaneously. If the players￿time-announcements di⁄er, the basic
game is played sequentially, with the order of moves as announced by the players. Hamilton
and Slutsky￿ s main results are that the two leader-follower con￿gurations (with either order
of play) constitute pure subgame perfect equilibria of the extended game only if at least one
player￿ s payo⁄ as follower weakly dominates her corresponding payo⁄ in the simultaneous
game. When, conversely, the payo⁄ of a follower is lower than in the simultaneous case,
the only pure strategy subgame Nash equilibrium prescribes that both players play simulta-
neously the basic game. In a symmetric duopoly in which some regularity conditions hold
(mainly single-valued and monotone best-replies), if ￿rms actions are strategic complements
(with increasing best-reply functions) the follower￿ s payo⁄dominates that of the leader, and
therefore that of the simultaneous case. When instead actions are strategic substitutes (with
decreasing best-reply functions) the opposite holds and a ￿rst-mover advantage arises:1
Some recent papers (Amir et al. 2000, and also Halmenschlager 2004, Atallah 2005,
Goel 1990, Crampes and Langinier 2003, De Bondt 2007, Tesoriere 2008) have attempted to
endogenize the timing of R&D investment in a model ￿ la d￿ Aspremont & Jacquemin (1988).
The spillover of R&D investments is crucial for these games to possess strategic substitutes
vs. strategic complements attributes and thus to give rise to simultaneous vs. sequential
endogenous timing R&D equilibria (see Amir et al., 2000). However, these models do not
take into consideration the possibility to form research agreements between ￿rms.
Our purpose is to bridge these otherwise separate streams of literature, the noncooperative
formation of R&D agreements and the endogenous timing literature, with the aim to study
the formation of research alliances when the timing of the investment in R&D is made
endogenous. Our approach is novel in that it allows for a far more complete picture of R&D
agreements, by considering the possible formation of these agreements over time. Firms may
prefer to wait and enter a research coalition at a subsequent moment of time. As observed by
Duso et al (2010), where an interesting empirical analysis is performed, ￿rms at each period
in time weight the bene￿ts against the costs of being a research cartel member. For example,
a larger number of participants (i.e. a larger pool of learning) may increase the bene￿ts of
1See also Dowrick (1985), Boyer and Moreaux (1987), Amir (1995), Amir and Grilo (1995), Amir, Grilo
and Jin (1999), von Stengel (2004) and Currarini and Marini (2003, 2004) and Marini (2008) for various
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entering a research cartel (Bloch 1995, Veugelers 1998).2 Moreover, the incentive to join a
R&D agreement is stronger in high-tech industries, due to higher gains from cooperation and
knowledge transmission (Cassiman and Veugelers 2002). These empirically relevant issues
have been neglected in theoretical studies.
Our approach aims to ￿ll this gap. It makes it possible to analyze whether the possibility
to cooperate in R&D across time can change the results of the existing R&D literature, in
particular, the results concerning the endogenous formation of R&D agreements.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the setup adopted in the paper.
Section 3 and 4 apply the model to the duopoly game ￿ la d￿ Aspremont & Jacquemin (1988)
with symmetric and asymmetric R&D spillover rates and present the main results. Section
5 concludes.
2. The Model
The typical approach to R&D collaboration among ￿rms usually assumes that at a ￿rst
stage a ￿rm can form an R&D alliance with its competitors and at a second stage the
formed alliance decides cooperatively its joint level of investment in R&D. At a third and
￿nal stage, every ￿rm sets noncooperatively its strategic market variable, typically quantity
or price, to compete oligopolistically with all other ￿rms. Our aim is to introduce a variant
of this setup assuming that at the ￿rst stage a ￿rm decides not only whether to form or
not an R&D agreement, but also the timing of its investment in R&D. Speci￿cally, both the
R&D agreement formation process and the timing of the investment are made endogenous.
Introducing endogenous timing basically determines at which stage a single ￿rm or an R&D
cartel will play its investment in R&D. As in Hamilton and Slutsky￿ s (1990) extensive game
with observed delay, if all ￿rms decide to play either as leader or as follower, they end up
playing simultaneously. In what follows, we formally introduce our model.
2.1. R&D Alliances & Timing Formation Game. We imagine that at a pre-play stage,
denoted with t0, every ￿rm i, with i = 1;2 and i 6= j, sends simultaneously a message to its
rival announcing both its intention to form or not a R&D alliance as well as its preferred
timing for the R&D investment. Every ￿rm￿ s message set Mi can be denoted as:
(2.1) Mi = [(fi;jg;t1);(fi;jg;t2);(fig;t1);(fig;t2)]:
The message space contains 16 di⁄erent message pro￿les m 2 M1 ￿ M2, which, in turn,






























Di⁄erently from Hamilton and Slutsky￿ s (1990) endogenous timing game applied to a model
￿ la d￿ Aspremont and Jacquemin￿ s (1988) (see Amir et al. 2000), here it is assumed that
the two ￿rms may also form an R&D cartel at period t1 or t2.3 We assume that in order to
form a research alliance with a given timing of investment in R&D requires the unanimity
of ￿rms￿decisions: when ￿rms send messages indicating both the same R&D coalition and
2On average, four ￿rms enter a research joint venture (RJV) yearly. The average entry decreases with the
age of these RJVs (Duso et al. 2010).
3Note that allowing the two ￿rms to play their cooperative investment strategy at di⁄erent stages, one at
period t1 and the other at period t2, does not alter the basic results of the analysis.TIMING AND R&D AGREEMENTS 5
the same investment timing, they will sign a binding agreement to invest at the prescribed
time; otherwise, they will invest as individual ￿rms with the timing prescribed by their own
messages. Formally, for i;j = 1;2 and j 6= i
￿
P (m) = f1;2g
￿ if mi = mj = (fi;jg;￿) and
P (m) = (fig
￿i ;fjg
￿j) if mi 6= mj.
The above rule prescribes that if both ￿rms agree to form the same alliance and to invest
with the same timing, the alliance will be created and thus will invest at that given time.
Conversely, if one ￿rm disagrees, either on the joint venture or on the investment timing, both
￿rms will play as singletons the R&D investment game, with the timing depending on their
message. The described R&D agreement formation rule re￿ ects an exclusive membership
rule, where the consensus of all members is required to complete the agreement.4
2.2. The Investment Game. Once every ￿rm has sent a message mi and a timing-
partition, denoted P(m) 2 P, has been induced on the set of ￿rms, every ￿rm decides
its cooperative or noncooperative investment according to the timing prescribed by P(m).
At this stage, as well as at the following stages, it is assumed that a ￿rm cannot manipu-
late its level of investment in order to convince its rival to renegotiate the timing-partition
decided at stage t0.
As in d￿ Aspremont & Jacquemin (1988) or in Yi & Shin (2000) every ￿rm is assumed to
set a ￿nite level of investment xi 2 Xi ￿ R+ a⁄ecting its pro￿t function via its production
cost ci(x1;x2) which, in turn, in￿ uences the ￿nal market competition between individual
￿rms. Denoting with qi 2 [0;1) the ￿nal market competition variable (here quantity), a
￿rm pro￿t function can be written as ￿i(q(x)).
In a research agreement f1;2g
￿ ￿rms will therefore set cooperatively their level of invest-



















given the pro￿le of quantities q = (q1;q2) which will be optimally chosen in the ￿nal market
stage.
If the ￿rms play simultaneously as singletons at stage ￿ = t1 or t2, the appropriate equilib-














4For a discussion on which coalition formation rule may be more appropriate according to the speci￿c
context, see the material contained in Hart & Kurz (1983), Ray (2006) and Yi (2003).6 MARCO A. MARINI, MARIA L. PETIT, AND ROBERTA SESTINI.
When ￿rms play sequentially, the relevant equilibrium investment will be a Stackelberg













and for the follower (￿rm j), gj : Xi ! Xj is the best-reply mapping,
gj (xi) = argmax
xj
￿j (q(xi;xj)):
Note that for the investment game to be well-de￿ned, all equilibria in (2.2), (2.3) and (2.4)
must exist and be unique.
2.3. The Market Game. Once the two ￿rms have either formed a research cartel or have
chosen their R&D investment as singletons at t1 or t2, in the last stage of the game (denoted
with t3) they set their market variable. We assume competition in quantities and a unique
Cournot equilibrium among ￿rms, given the equilibrium level of investment xc￿, or x￿￿ or
















2.4. Strategies. Firm strategies in the described multi-stage game can formally be ex-
pressed as follows. When the investment game is played simultaneously, either at stage t1 or
t2, every ￿rm i 2 N strategy set is a triple ￿sim
i = (mi;xi;qi) where, in turn, mi is ￿rm i-th
message, such that mi = (Si;￿i) 2 (fig;fi;jg) ￿ (t1;t2) with Si being a nonempty coalition
selected by the ￿rm i, xi : Mi ￿ Mj ! Xi is the investment choice (a mapping from the
message space to a given investment level), and qi : Xi ￿ Xj ! R+ the output choice, i.e.
a mapping from ￿rm investments to a positive level of output. When the investment game
is played sequentially, the strategy sets are triples ￿
seq
i = (mi;xi;qi) and ￿
seq
j = (mj;gj;qj);
for the i-th leader and the j-th follower respectively, where the follower investment choice is
a mapping gj : Mi ￿ Mj ￿ Xi ! Xj.
2.5. Stable R&D agreements. Given the equilibrium quantities of the market game
played by ￿rms at stage t3, and given the level of investment decided simultaneously or se-
quentially at stages t1 and/or t2 either by the research cartel or by individual ￿rms, all ￿rms
receive a pro￿t that, with a slight abuse of notation, can be denoted as ￿i(q￿ (x￿(P(m))),
where q￿ (x￿(P(m)) indicates the equilibrium quantity pro￿le when the investment pro￿le,
as de￿ned by (2.2), or by (2.3) or ￿nally by (2.4) is decided by the ￿rms in a given partition
P(m) induced by the message pro￿le m sent at stage t0.
We need to make explicit a concept of equilibrium for the message game played at stage
t0. For this purpose, we introduce two di⁄erent equilibrium concepts. The ￿rst is a standard
Nash equilibrium of the R&D partition-timing game. The second introduces a coalitional
stability requirement, implying that a structure P(m) is stable if and only if the message
pro￿le m is a strong Nash equilibrium, i.e., cannot be improved upon by an alternative
message announced by a ￿rm or by a group of ￿rms, here the grand coalition. Formally,TIMING AND R&D AGREEMENTS 7
when a given timing-partition P is Nash stable, the pro￿le ￿￿ = (m￿;q￿;x￿) is a subgame
perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE) of the entire game. When, as additional requirement, the
message pro￿le m played at t0 is also strong Nash, ￿￿ is again SPNE, with the property to
be Pareto-e¢ cient for the two ￿rms.
De￿nition 1. (Nash stability) A feasible R&D timing-partition P 2 P is Nash stable if
P = P(m￿), for some m￿ with the following properties: there exists no m
0
i 2 Mi for every











De￿nition 2. (Strong Nash stability) A feasible R&D timing-partition P 2 P is strongly
stable if P = P(b m), for some b m with the following properties:
￿i(q
￿(x





for i = 1;2 and m
0













i; b mj))) < ￿j(q
￿(x
￿(P(b m)))
for j 6= i:
Note that a strong Nash equilibrium message pro￿le b m is both a Nash equilibrium and
Pareto-optimum.
We are now ready to apply our framework to d￿ Aspremont & Jacquemin￿ s (1988) well-
known model.
3. Duopoly with Symmetric Spillovers
Following d￿ Aspremont & Jacquemin (1988), we assume a linear inverse market demand
function
P(Q) = maxf0; a ￿ bQg;
with Q =
P2
i=1qi and a linear cost function for every ￿rm i = 1;2 decreasing in R&D
investment xi,
(3.1) ci(xi;xj) = (c ￿ xi ￿ ￿xj)
for j 6= i, and c ￿ xi ￿ ￿xj. In this setup, learning resulting from investment in R&D
characterizes the production process, implying that marginal and unit costs decrease as the
investment in R&D increases. As in d￿ Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988) we allow for the
possibility of imperfect appropriability (i.e. technological spillovers between the ￿rms), by
introducing a spillover parameter ￿ 2 [0;1]. Obviously the case of no spillovers (￿ = 0)
may only arise in a situation of strong intellectual protection. More frequently, however,
involuntary information leaks occur due to reverse engineering, industrial espionage or by
hiring away employees of an innovative ￿rm. The cases of partial to full spillovers can be
modelled by setting 0 < ￿ ￿ 1. At this stage the parameter ￿ in (3.1) is assumed to be
identical for all ￿rms. However, in Section 4, this parameter, though exogenously given, will
di⁄er due to the cooperative versus non-cooperative nature and to the timing properties of
the R&D investment game.8 MARCO A. MARINI, MARIA L. PETIT, AND ROBERTA SESTINI.







with ￿ > 0. This guarantees decreasing returns to R&D expenditure (see e.g. Cheng 1984;
d￿ Aspremont and Jacquemin 1988). As a result, under Cournot competition in the product
market, and setting for simplicity b = 1, the last stage pro￿t function for each ￿rm i = 1;2
can be obtained as a function of (xi;xj):
(3.2) ￿i (q
￿ (xi;xj)) =









Note that in this setup, for su¢ ciently high R&D spillover rates (￿ > 1=2), there are pos-
itive R&D cartel-externalities, as the formation of a cooperative agreement a⁄ects positively
all remaining ￿rms. Only in this case (i.e. ￿ > 1=2) ￿rms￿cooperative choice implies social
e¢ ciency, which instead is not guaranteed for ￿ < 1=2.
3.1. Main Assumptions. Some assumptions are now introduced on the model to ensure
the existence and uniqueness of all stages equilibria as well as to simplify the comparative
statics. For the symmetric spillover case the assumptions are the following:
A.1 (Quantity stage constraint). For both ￿rms, (a=c) > 2.
A.2 (Pro￿t concavity and best-reply contraction property). For both ￿rms, ￿ > 4=3.
A.3 (Boundaries on R&D e⁄orts) For every ￿rm i = 1;2, Xi = [0;c] and ￿ >
a(2￿￿)(￿+1)
4:5c
for ￿ < 1=2 and ￿ >
a(￿+1)2
4:5c for ￿ > 1=2.
As explained in detail in the Appendix, assumption A.1 simply ensures that the last
stage Cournot equilibrium quantities for every ￿rm are unique and interior, with associated
positive pro￿ts.
Assumption A.2 guarantees both the strict concavity of every ￿rm payo⁄ (3.2) in its
own investment xi (guaranteed for ￿ > 8
9) as well as a contraction property on every ￿rm
best-replies gi(xj), which requires that ￿ > 4
3.
Assumption A.3 prescribes a compact R&D investment set for every ￿rm and imposes
some Inada-type conditions to obtain interior investment equilibria in all noncooperative
(simultaneous or sequential) and cooperative R&D games (see Amir et al. 2000, Amir et al.
2011, Tesoriere 2008 and Stepanova and Tesoriere 2011).
Note that by assumption A.2 every ￿rm payo⁄ is strictly concave in its own investment
choice and thus best-replies are single-valued and continuous. Investment spaces are com-
pact by A.3 and therefore a Nash equilibrium exists by Brower ￿xed-point theorem. The
contraction property implied by A.2 ensures uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium x￿￿. The
existence of a Stackelberg equilibrium x￿￿ - a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE) of
the sequential R&D game - is guaranteed by both ￿rm continuous payo⁄s and continuous
best-replies, thus implying that a ￿rm as leader faces a continuous maximization problem
over a closed set. Then, by the Weierstrass theorem, a SPNE equilibrium exists. Its unique-
ness is generically ensured by the fact that ￿rm best-replies are single-valued and monotoneTIMING AND R&D AGREEMENTS 9
and all ￿rm payo⁄s are strictly monotone in their rival investment. In fact, for every i = 1;2










Hence, along the best-reply gj(xi) of its rival￿ s, no multiple argmax are possible for a i-th
￿rm acting as leader. The follower ￿rm will instead act ￿ la Nash and, by the property of
best-replies, its investment choice will be uniquely de￿ned. Moreover, the strict concavity of
every ￿rm￿ s pro￿t implies that also the joint R&D cartel pro￿t is strictly concave and will
be maximized by a unique investment pro￿le x. We will prove in the next section that the
ex ante symmetry and strict concavity of ￿rm pro￿t functions also implies that, when the
two ￿rms form a R&D cartel, they set cooperatively the same level of R&D investment.
In the next section we start characterizing all endogenously stable R&D agreements with
endogenous timing played by the two ￿rms. We then extend the symmetric set-up to the case
of asymmetric spillover rate among ￿rms. This can o⁄er a broader view on a recent stream
of literature concerning the endogenous timing under asymmetric spillovers (De Bondt and
Vandekerckhove 2008, Tesoriere 2008).
3.2. Cooperative R&D. The R&D cartel made of all ￿rms N = f1;2g (i.e. the grand
coalition) investing cooperatively in R&D is assumed to maximize the sum of ￿rms￿pro￿ts,



















where x =(xi;xj) is any arbitrary pro￿le of R&D investment carried out simultaneously by
the two ￿rms either at ￿ = t1 or at ￿ = t2, for i = 1;2 and j 6= i. By concavity and symmetry
of ￿rms￿payo⁄s, the level of investment that maximizes (3.3) is the same for both ￿rms, i.e.
is such that xc￿
i = xc￿
j : A simple proof is o⁄ered by the following lemma.
Lemma 1. Let assumptions A.1-A.3 hold. Then, the cooperative R&D investment pro￿le
xc￿ must be such that xc￿
i = xc￿
j .
Proof. See the Appendix. ￿
Maximizing the pro￿t of the R&D cartel in (3.3) and given Lemma 1, a ￿rm cooperative





2(a ￿ c)(1 + ￿)
9￿ ￿ 2(1 + ￿)2














9￿ ￿ 2(1 + ￿)2:
3.3. Noncooperative Simultaneous R&D. Di⁄erentiating (3.2) and exploiting the sym-






2(a ￿ c)(2 ￿ ￿)
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￿(a ￿ c)2(9￿ ￿ 2(￿ ￿ 2)2)
(9￿ ￿ 2(2 ￿ ￿)(1 + ￿))2 :
By the Pareto-e¢ ciency of xc￿
i (f1;2g
￿) (for the two ￿rms) we can establish the following
Lemma.
Lemma 2. Under high (low) spillover rate ￿ > 1
2 (￿ < 1
2) the cooperative investment level





Proof. See the Appendix. ￿
3.4. Sequential R&D Investment Game. Using again (3.2) we can easily obtain the
best-reply of the j-th ￿rm playing as follower the investment game:
(3.7) gj(xi) =
2(2 ￿ ￿)(a ￿ c ￿ (1 ￿ 2￿)xi)
9￿ ￿ 2(￿ ￿ 2)2 :





































4 (20￿ + 16)+￿









































(a ￿ c)2￿(9￿ + 8￿ ￿ 2￿2 ￿ 8)￿2
￿2
Under assumptions A.1-A.3, comparing R&D equilibrium investment levels, we can state
the following:
Proposition 1. (i) When ￿rm R&D investments are strategic substitutes (￿ < 1
2) there










(ii) When ￿rm R&D investments are strategic substitutes (￿ < 1
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for i = 1;2 and j 6= i.
Proof. See the Appendix. ￿
The above proposition provides a full ranking of ￿rm equilibrium investment levels, as
it combines the well-known results by d￿ Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988), who compare
cooperative and simultaneous noncooperative R&D levels, with Amir et al. (2000) analysis,
focussing on sequential vs. simultaneous noncooperative outcomes. Lemma 2 has already




i ) which, combined with Amir￿ s









Proposition 1 completes this ranking by also including the cooperative investment levels. It
can be noticed (see expression (3.7)) that the level of spillover is crucial to determine the
slope of the follower￿ s best-reply in the investment game. Thus, when the spillover rate is
very low (case (i)), the follower￿ s best-reply is extremely steep (and negatively sloped) and
this strongly contracts its equilibrium investment, which is thus even lower than that yielded
under a cooperative agreement. A ￿rm investing as leader at stage t1 can therefore pro￿tably
expand its investment, and this occurs in particular when the cost of the investment (which
depends on ￿) is very low and an investor is very unlikely to be imitated (low ￿). Under
such circumstances, being a leader may become more pro￿table than investing cooperatively.
When instead spillover rates start to increase, the cooperative investment overcomes that
of a follower, although the leader￿ s investment remains very high. Finally, for ￿ > 1=2, the
cooperation implies the e¢ cient and highest level of R&D investment, regardless of the level
of investment costs.
In what follows we perform some comparisons of the ￿rm payo⁄s obtained in the di⁄erent
investment games by combining the results of Lemma 1 and Proposition 1 above, with Amir￿ s
et al. (2000) analysis. We recall that in Amir￿ s et al. (2000) paper, the following ranking is






















￿￿) for ￿ >
1
2
where L, N and F denote the leader/Nash simultaneous/follower roles, respectively, in the






i (x￿￿). Moreover, the following lemma proves that for ￿ < 1
2 (￿ > 1
2) a follower
(leader) payo⁄ can never be greater than that of a ￿rm in a cooperative agreement.
Lemma 3. Under high (low) spillover rate ￿ > 1
2 (￿ < 1
2) the pro￿t of a ￿rm in a R&D












Proof. See the Appendix. ￿
5In what follows we maintain the convention that ￿rm i indicates the leader while ￿rm j indicates the
follower in the sequential investment game.12 MARCO A. MARINI, MARIA L. PETIT, AND ROBERTA SESTINI.
The following two propositions complete the full ranking of ￿rm payo⁄s in all di⁄erent
cases and for all levels of spillover rates.
Proposition 2. When ￿rm R&D investments are strategic substitutes (￿ < 1
2): (i) there
exists a ￿￿(￿) and a ￿ such that, for ￿ < ￿￿(￿) and ￿ < ￿, the pro￿t obtained by a ￿rm
playing as leader in a sequential investment game is higher than that obtained in a cooperative


































Proof. See the Appendix. ￿










the di⁄erence between the pro￿t obtained by a ￿rm in a cooperative agreement and that
obtained by the leader in a sequential game. When ￿rm investments are strategic substitutes
(￿ < 1=2) there exists a narrow range of the spillover rate (between 0 and ￿￿) for which
being leader, and thus expanding the investment, turns out to be extremely pro￿table. This
occurs only when the cost to invest in R&D is extremely low (￿ < ￿).
[FIGURE 1 AND 2 APPROXIMATELY HERE]
The proposition that follows completes our ￿ndings for the model with symmetric spillovers
by comparing the ￿rms￿pro￿tability under di⁄erent arrangements when R&D investments
are strategic complements.
Proposition 3. When ￿rm investments are strategic complements (￿ > 1
2) the pro￿t ob-
tained by a ￿rm in a cooperative R&D agreement is always higher than the pro￿t obtained


















Proof. See the Appendix. ￿
As it can be observed in ￿gure 4, for ￿ > 1=2, the highest level of investment is selected by
the research cartel. Under the sequential game the follower free-rides on the leader invest-
ment and gains a higher pro￿t. However, as shown in ￿gure 4, the di⁄erence between the
cooperative payo⁄ and the follower payo⁄ is positive and monotonically increasing through-
out the interval for ￿ under analysis.
[FIGURE 3 AND 4 APPROXIMATELY HERE]TIMING AND R&D AGREEMENTS 13
Finally, the next two propositions characterize all Nash and strongly stable timing-partitions
according to De￿nitions 1 and 2.
Proposition 4. (Nash stability) (i) When the spillover rate ￿ < ￿￿(￿), and ￿ < ￿, the Nash


















































Proof. See the Appendix. ￿
It is obvious that, if we require the strong stability of timing-partitions, by symmetry
all noncooperative partitions in which ￿rms invest simultaneously ￿ la Nash are Pareto-
dominated by the cooperative partitions. Forming a cooperative research agreement to
coordinate costly investments in R&D is clearly more pro￿table than playing the symmetric
investment game ￿ la Nash. If, however, ￿ < ￿￿(￿), we have proven that being leader in the
investment game yields a higher pro￿t than playing cooperatively, and therefore the only
timing-partition that remains strongly stable is the grand coalition investing at time t1. A
cooperative agreement, to be stable, requires that ￿rms anticipate strategically their joint
investments.
Proposition 5. (Strong stability) (i) when the spillover rate ￿ < ￿￿(￿) and ￿ < ￿, the only

















Proof. See the Appendix. ￿
Our results depart from those obtained in the previous literature. In particular, since in
our set-up ￿rms can form a strategic alliance to invest cooperatively in R&D, di⁄erently
from Amir et al. (2000) the alliance of ￿rms always constitutes a SPNE of the whole game.
However, our model suggests that in forming alliances ￿rms have to consider carefully the
e⁄ect of timing. If a group of ￿rms procrastinates too much its cooperative investment, it
may risk a defection by its partner who breaks the alliance to invest as leader. To avoid this
problem, ￿rms have to anticipate strategically their joint investment in R&D. As illustrated
in detail, this happens only when investing in R&D is not very costly and the investment
spillover is very low. For higher spillover rate, to discipline the stability of a research cartel is
easier and time-constraints for the investment are no longer required. Our model also shows
that, without requiring Pareto-optimality, the noncooperative simultaneous (or sequential)
con￿gurations are also stable under low (high) spillover rate, ￿ < 1=2 (￿ > 1=2), as already
established in Amir et al. (2000).14 MARCO A. MARINI, MARIA L. PETIT, AND ROBERTA SESTINI.
3.5. An Extension to n-symmetric Firms. The extension of our model to n-symmetric
￿rms would allow to check the stability of more complex alliances between ￿rms coordinating
their investment in R&D. However, including more than two ￿rms in our analysis with
endogenous timing makes the model highly unmanageable. Only intuitive conclusions can
be drawn with the help of our previous analysis and some well known existing results. A ￿rst
observation concerns the whole industry R&D agreement (grand coalition of ￿rms) investing





when at stage t0 all ￿rms i = 1;2;::;n send the message mi = (fNg;t2). This partition can
be strongly stable if every individual ￿rm investing as follower at stage t2 would be better
o⁄ than any ￿rm participating to a R&D agreement investing at stage t1 as leader. Thus,





of these alternative messages, m
0
S = (fSg;t2) or m
00



















by playing as leaders
in (3.11) they would not improve a fortiori by playing simultaneously in (3.11). Therefore,
if we show that in the partition (3.11) all ￿rms within the research cartel S (regardless




, the stability of the
grand coalition agreement is proved as a result. When investment decisions are strategic
complements, it can be proved that the payo⁄ of a symmetric ￿rm playing as singleton
follower against the coalition S playing as leader is always higher than the payo⁄ of every
￿rm in S.6 Hence, given the e¢ ciency of the grand coalition, it would be impossible for any
coalition S to improve by deviating as leader, given that followers would improve even more
their payo⁄s. Similarly, it can be shown that when R&D investments are strategic substitutes
(￿ < 1=2) a coalition S ￿ N made of followers is beaten by individual ￿rms investing as




- made by the grand coalition of ￿rms investing
at stage 1- is strongly stable. The strong stability of these two cooperative timing-partitions
already observed in our duopoly model thus extends to an analogous endogenous timing
game played by n-symmetric ￿rms.
4. Duopoly with Asymmetric Spillovers
Introducing asymmetric spillovers equals to introducing a higher degree of realism into the
model. As is well known (see e.g. Atallah 2005), asymmetries may derive from di⁄erences
in protection practices, from geographical localization (e.g. Petit et al. 2009), from product
di⁄erentiation (Amir et al. 2000), or from sequential moves in the R&D game, as in R&D
models with endogenous timing (Tesoriere 2008). Other sources of asymmetry can arise from
di⁄erent technological capabilities, as in Amir and Wooders (1999, 2000), where knowledge
may leak only from the more R&D-active ￿rm to the rival, or from a better absorption
capacity in￿ uencing the outcome of a technological race, as in De Bondt and Henriques
(1995).
6See for a formal proof of this fact, Currarini and Marini (2003, 2004).TIMING AND R&D AGREEMENTS 15
The spillover asymmetry arising in our model stems instead from the cooperative versus
the non-cooperative nature of the R&D game and from the timing of the R&D investment
process. The parameter ￿i, (0 ￿ ￿i ￿ 1) will represent (henceforth) the incoming spillover
for ￿rm i = 1;2. Moreover, let ￿N
i denote the ￿rm spillover rate under simultaneous non-
cooperative R&D, ￿C
i the spillover rate under R&D cooperation, and ￿L
i , ￿F
j the spillover
rates for the leader and the follower in the investment game, with i;j = 1;2, i 6= j.
Our assumptions on spillovers asymmetry are based on the following considerations:
(i) When the two ￿rms invest simultaneously and noncooperatively at stage one or two
their spillover rate is assumed to be symmetric and lower than or equal to 0:5 (i.e., ￿N
1 =
￿N
2 ￿ 0:5). The idea is that ￿rm competition in R&D and the simultaneity of their decisions
does not allow for a high amount of knowledge transmission.
(ii) When a noncooperative sequential investment in R&D takes place, the spillover rate
can be though to be favorable to the ￿rm playing as follower and unfavorable to the ￿rm
playing as leader (i.e. ￿F
j > ￿L
i ). In particular we shall set ￿F
j > 0:5 and ￿L
i ￿ 0:5.
A sequential order of moves in the R&D investment game implies a greater amount of
knowledge leaking out from the leader to the follower than vice versa. The rationale is that
knowledge leaks also through imitation, thus leading to a strong advantage for the ￿rm that
is able to observe the ￿rst mover innovative outcome. Therefore, bene￿ts from spillovers
should be lower for a ￿rst mover (see also Tesoriere 2008).
(iii) We introduce the hypothesis that industry-speci￿c features in￿ uence the amount of
knowledge leaks (e.g., legal appropriation regimes, complexity of know-how a⁄ecting the
degree of appropriation) which is independent from the possibility of imitation and thus
from the order of moves. In particular we assume that sector-speci￿c features determining
the intensity of knowledge di⁄usion a⁄ect to the same extent the incoming spillover for the
leader in the sequential game (i.e. ￿L
i ) and the incoming spillovers for both ￿rms in the
simultaneous noncooperative game (i.e., ￿N
i i = 1;2). Therefore we will set ￿L
i = ￿N
i .
(iv) When the two ￿rms play cooperatively and form a research cartel, they generally
also agree to share to some extent the knowledge obtained from their joint R&D e⁄ort. It
seems realistic to assume that they might agree to fully share their knowledge, and therefore
their spillover rates will be symmetric and su¢ ciently high (i.e. ￿C
1 = ￿C
2 close or equal to
one). Moreover, we assume that knowledge leaks occurring mainly through imitation and
favouring the follower in a sequential game are less intense if compared with the voluntary
exchange of technological knowledge typical of a research agreement. Thus, we maintain
that ￿C
i > ￿F
j , for i;j = 1;2, i 6= j:
Taking into account all the above inequalities, our assumptions on the relationships among
spillovers values can be summarized as follows:








i ￿ 0 i = 1;2, j 6= i
with ￿L
i = ￿N
i ￿ 0:5 and ￿F
j > 0:5.
4.1. Main assumptions. Also in this section we introduce some assumptions needed to
ensure the existence and uniqueness of equilibria at all stages:
B.1 (quantity stage constraint). As in the case of symmetric spillovers, a=c > 2 for both
￿rms.
B.2 (Pro￿t concavity and best-reply contraction property). Again, for both ￿rms, ￿ > 4=3.16 MARCO A. MARINI, MARIA L. PETIT, AND ROBERTA SESTINI.





9c , with 0:5 < ￿C
i ￿ 1.
Assumption B.1 does not vary with respect to the symmetric case. Assumption B.2 deals
with the strict concavity of every ￿rm￿ s pro￿t (3.2) with respect to own investment xi. Given
our assumptions on spillovers in the noncooperative simultaneous game, i.e. ￿N
i ￿ 0:5, the
SOC requires that ￿ > 8
9. Likewise, the SOC for pro￿t maximization in the case of a
research cartel, given that ￿C
i ￿ 1, requires, in the most stringent case, that ￿ > 8
9 as well.
The contraction properties on both ￿rms best-replies gi(xj) and gj(xi) introduced in section
3.1 are still valid and implied by ￿ > 4=3 (see the Appendix). Assumption B.3 follows the
same logic of A.3. As previously discussed, from the strict concavity of pro￿ts it comes out
that each best reply is single-valued and continuous. The existence of a Nash equilibrium
is therefore guaranteed. The contraction property in B.2 ensures uniqueness of the Nash
equilibrium. In order to have interior equilibria it has to hold true that:
@￿i (x(q￿))
@xi
= 2(2 ￿ ￿j)[a ￿ 2c(1 ￿ 2￿i)] > 0
for i;j = 1;2, i 6= j. It su¢ ces assumption B.1 for the above expression to be strictly
positive.
4.2. Noncooperative Sequential R&D with Asymmetric Spillovers. Since only in
the case of a game with sequential moves at the investment stage our calculations di⁄er from
the previous analysis, we shall deal henceforth extensively with this scenario. Our main aim
is to investigate whether the asymmetry in the transmission of knowledge between ￿rms is
relevant for the endogenous formation of research alliances.
Using an asymmetric-spillover speci￿cation, every ￿rm￿ s objective function at the market
game stage is given by




with i = 1;2 and i 6= j.












Di⁄erentiating (4.2) we get the best-reply for the follower in the investment game:
gj(xi) =
2(2 ￿ ￿L
i )[(a ￿ c) ￿ (1 ￿ 2￿F
j )xi]
9￿ ￿ 2(2 ￿ ￿L
i )2TIMING AND R&D AGREEMENTS 17

















































































Let the assumptions on spillovers in equation (4.1) as well as assumptions B.1-B.3 hold.
Comparing ￿rm R&D equilibrium investment levels under asymmetric spillovers, we can
state:
Proposition 6. There exists a ~ ￿ 2 (0;1=2) such that, if ￿N
i = ￿L





i . If instead ￿N
i = ￿L




i , for i;j = 1;2 i 6= j.
Proof. See the Appendix. ￿
An illustration of this result is shown in Figure 5. To give an intuition, when spillovers are
low, the asymmetry between the incoming spillover of the leader (￿L
i ) and that of the follower
(￿F
j ) is strong (since ￿F
j is always greater than 0:5). Therefore, the leader has the lowest
incentive to invest in R&D since the high outgoing spillover e⁄ect overcomes the ￿rst-mover
advantage e⁄ect. Conversely the follower takes advantage of a high learning opportunity and
of low knowledge leaks. Moreover, in this case, the R&D investment of the follower overcomes
that of the cooperative ￿rm, since a competition e⁄ect prevails. Conversely, when spillovers
are high, the asymmetry between leader and follower decreases. In this case a free-riding
e⁄ect may prevail for both players and the cooperative outcome may become convenient,
since cooperation between ￿rms succeeds in internalizing knowledge externalities.
Firms pro￿ts could be compared only via numerical simulations. In what follows the
numerical values assigned to the parameters are as follows: a = 38, c = 18, ￿ = 2. In
addition, we assume that in the case of cooperation ￿rms agree to share a high amount of
technological knowledge. Thus we assign a constant value ￿C
i = 0:8. Moreover we set the
incoming spillover of the follower such that 1 ￿ ￿C
i > ￿F
j > 0:5 (for instance ￿F
j = 0:6 as in
Figures 5 and 6).
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When instead ￿L
1 = ￿N










































[FIGURES 5 AND 6 APPROXIMATELY HERE]
These results can be explained by considering that joint cooperative agreements across
time or at time t1 are particularly at risk when there is a strong advantage to be follower in
the R&D investment game. As a matter of fact, ￿rms prefer to wait and observe the rival￿ s
move rather then trying to reach an agreement. This happens in particular when spillovers
are extremely unbalanced (i.e. when ￿L
1 = ￿N
i ￿ ^ ￿) towards ￿rms that wait before investing,
thus conferring a strong "follower advantage".
Our ￿ndings complement the few existing results (Amir et al., 2000; Tesoriere, 2008) on
endogenous sequencing in R&D investment with asymmetric spillover rates. In particular,




j = 1). Under these values he proves that the only timing con￿guration which is a
SPNE involves simultaneous noncooperative play at the R&D stage (with zero spillovers).
In contrast, in our setup the noncooperative simultaneous con￿guration may not be the only
Nash stable timing-partition and in addition is never strongly stable, as ￿rms prefer to form
an R&D cartel than playing (suboptimally) as singletons the investment game.
5. Concluding Remarks
This paper constitutes a ￿rst attempt to bridge two usually distinct streams of economic
literature, one dealing with the endogenous formation of R&D agreements, the other trying
to determine endogenously the order of R&D investments among ￿rms in a model with
spillovers ￿ la D￿ Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988). This paper has introduced a new set-up
in which ￿rms express both their intention to form or not an alliance and at the same time
the stage in which to exert their e⁄ort in R&D. This allows to assess the stability of research
cartels against deviations occurring across time. Every ￿rm can express its willingness to
play noncooperatively as leader or follower according to the circumstances. Our results
show that the nature of the interaction among the ￿rms in the investment game plays an
important role. In particular, under symmetric spillovers and when the level of spillover is
extremely low (and thus R&D investments are highly substitutes) both ￿rms want to play the
investment game as leaders and, as a result, they can easily end up investing simultaneously
either cooperatively or noncooperatively. In this case, any cooperative agreement, to be
stable, must contain a commitment to invest at time 1. A cooperative agreement of this sort
would remain stable also against deviations by coalitions of ￿rms, if we include in the model
a number of symmetric ￿rms higher than two. When instead R&D investment are strategic
complements, our model predicts that both sequential (noncooperative) and simultaneous
(cooperative) R&D con￿gurations are stable against individual deviations. However, only
cooperative agreements are strongly stable and, in this case, the timing of investment seemsTIMING AND R&D AGREEMENTS 19
irrelevant for the stability of cooperation. Finally, when the spillovers rates are asymmetric
and assumed favourable to the ￿rm investing as follower, the model shows that a R&D
agreement to be stable requires that the joint investment is strategically delayed to avoid
that a ￿rm breaks the agreement to exploit the existing "second-mover advantage". This
occurs, in particular, when the incoming spillover of the follower is much higher then that
of the leader.
6. Appendix
Proofs of Lemmata and Propositions
Lemma 1. Let assumptions A.1-A.3 hold. Thus, the cooperative R&D investment pro￿le
xc￿(the pro￿le which maximizes the pro￿t of the R&D cartel (3.3) must be such that xc￿
i = xc￿
j .
Proof. We proceed by contradiction. Let us assume that xc￿
i 6= xc￿
j . Let a strategy for ￿rms
i = 1;2 and j 6= i be such that
(6.1) e x ￿ ￿x
c￿
i + (1 ￿ ￿)x
c￿
j :
for any value of ￿ 2 (0;1). By the convexity of every ￿rms￿investment set Xi = Xj = X =
[0;c], e x 2 X. By (6.1) it must be either that
x
c￿






j > e x > x
c￿
i :
Moreover, by the strict concavity of ￿i (xi;xj) in xi for every i = 1;2 with j 6= i,
￿j(x
c￿



















Furthermore, if ￿ > 1
2, either
￿i(e x;e x) > ￿i(e x;x
c￿









￿j(e x;e x) > ￿j(x
c￿








since a ￿rm￿ s pro￿t ￿i (q￿ (xi;xj)) increases monotonically with its rival￿ s investment. By
the ex ante symmetry of ￿rms￿payo⁄s it follows that
￿i(e x;e x) = ￿j(e x;e x)
and then























pro￿t of the R&D cartel. The same reasoning can be repeated if ￿ < 1
2 and ￿rm pro￿ts de-
crease monotonically with the rival￿ s investment. Finally, if ￿ = 1
2 we know that cooperative
and noncooperative R&D investments coincide. By continuity and strict concavity of ￿rm
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exists and is unique. We have thus proved that in our set-up such pro￿le of strategies is
always symmetric, i.e., xc￿
i = xc￿
j . ￿
Lemma 2. Under high (low) spillover rate ￿ > 1
2 (￿ < 1
2) the cooperative investment level




































where the ￿rst inequality is due to the Pareto-e¢ ciency of xc￿and the second by the Nash
equilibrium property. Thus, by monotone negative (positive) externalities for ￿ < 1
2 (￿ > 1
2),
it follows that xc￿ < x￿￿ (xc￿ > x￿￿). ￿
Proposition 1. (i) When ￿rms￿R&D investments are strategic substitutes (￿ < 1
2) there










(ii) When ￿rms￿R&D investments are strategic substitutes (￿ < 1





















for i = 1;2.










2(a ￿ c)(2 ￿ ￿)￿
￿
￿
2(a ￿ c)(1 + ￿)
9￿ ￿ 2(1 + ￿)2 = 0






5￿ + 2, which is strictly positive for ￿ ￿ ￿, where
￿ = 16=9. Condition A.3 for ￿ < 1=2 requires that ￿ >
a(2￿￿)(￿+1)
4:5c and since this constraint













< 0. It can be checked that the de￿ned interval for ￿ is
compatible with a market size-cost ratio a=c ￿ 32=9. Moreover, by (6.2) for 1=2 > ￿ > ￿￿(￿)






￿ 0. Combining these facts with Amir￿ s et al. (2000)
ranking on leader-follower and Nash simultaneous investments, the results follow. (iii) For
















= sign 2￿ (2￿ ￿ 1)
2 > 0
which holds for any ￿ and thus also for ￿ 2 (1=2;1]. Again, combining the above fact with
Amir￿ s et al. (2000) results, the ranking between R&D investments is proven. ￿
Lemma 3. Under high (low) spillover rate ￿ > 1
2 (￿ < 1
2) the pro￿t of a ￿rm in a
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contradicting the e¢ ciency of pro￿le xc￿








































which is a contradiction. ￿
Proposition 2. When ￿rms R&D investments are strategic substitutes (￿ < 1
2): (i)
there exists a ￿￿(￿) and a ￿ such that, for ￿ < ￿￿(￿) and ￿ < ￿, the pro￿t obtained by
a ￿rm playing as leader in a sequential investment game is higher than that obtained in a


















































































9￿ ￿ 2(1 + ￿)2 ￿










5￿ + 2, requiring that ￿ < 16=9 to be positive. Since by
A.3 ￿ >
a(2￿￿)(￿+1)














holds true. (ii) For ￿ 2 [0;1=2), when either ￿ ￿ ￿￿ or ￿ > 16













9￿ ￿ 2(1 + ￿)2 ￿




The payo⁄s ranking can therefore be completed as stated in (6.4)-(6.3) using Lemma 2 and22 MARCO A. MARINI, MARIA L. PETIT, AND ROBERTA SESTINI.
Amir￿ s et al. (2000) results. ￿
Proposition 3. When ￿rms investments are strategic complements (￿ > 1
2) the pro￿t
obtained by a ￿rm in a cooperative R&D agreement is always higher than the pro￿t obtained
























































































Proposition 4. (Nash stability) (i) When the spillover rate ￿ < ￿￿(￿), and ￿ < ￿, the

















































Proof. (i) By proposition 2, for ￿ 2 [0;￿￿(￿)) < 1=2 and ￿ < ￿, investing as leader at
stage t1 is more pro￿table for ￿rms than forming a cooperative agreement. As a result,




cannot be Nash-stable, because a ￿rm i can pro￿tably deviates
with an alternative message m0











can pro￿tably be objected by the j-th
￿rm who, instead of playing as follower, would prefer to invest simultaneously. This is feasible
if it sends the message m0
















pro￿tably objected by any individual ￿rm. (ii) We know by proposition 2 that when ￿ 2
[￿￿(￿);1=2) the payo⁄ gained in a cooperative agreement is higher than that obtained by
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cannot be objected by individual deviations. (iii) For ￿ 2 (1=2;1], by proposition 3 the




















cannot be pro￿tably objected neither by the
leader nor by the follower (see proposition 3), and the result follows. ￿
Proposition 5. (Strong stability) (i) When the spillover rate ￿ < ￿￿(￿) and ￿ < ￿, the
















Proof. (i) This result easily follows from proposition 2 and by the fact that all other timing-






. However, since by proposition 2, ￿N
i (x￿￿) > ￿F
j (x￿￿) for





can pro￿tably be objected by the follower,
who prefers to invest simultaneously and, that, by sending the message m0
j = (fjg;t1) can





. However, the latter partition can, in turn,




sent by both ￿rms, and therefore, is not strongly stable.




can be objected by a ￿rm sending an alternative mes-
sage m0




. (ii) By proposition 2 and 3 it follows that for 2 [￿￿(￿);1] all sequential and
simultaneous Nash timing-partitions payo⁄s are dominated by cooperative agreements. As a
result, the two message pro￿les m = (fi;jg;t1);(fi;jg;t1)) and m = (fi;jg;t2);(fi;jg;t2))









both strongly stable. ￿
Proposition 6. There exists a ~ ￿ 2 (0;1=2) such that, if ￿N
i = ￿L





i . If instead ￿N
i = ￿L




i , for i;j = 1;2 i 6= j.
Proof. Consider ￿rst the equilibrium investment levels under the extreme assumptions that
￿L
i = 0, ￿N
i = 0, ￿F
j = 1, ￿C




















Moreover, substituting the above values for the spillover parameters into x￿￿
i and xc￿
i , as


















for i = 1;2.
Then,















j =1 = ￿9￿2 ￿
8￿+16 < 0 i⁄￿ > ￿4=9+4
p
10=9. This condition is implied by the SOC of ￿rm i competing
a￿la Stackelberg at the R&D investment stage - evaluated at ￿L
i = 0, ￿F
j = 1 - which requires




















j =1 for ￿ > 4=9 + 4
p
2=9, which, as shown above, is
always respected.
























We now examine the ranking of R&D investments when ￿L
i = ￿N
i = 0:5, still maintaining
the assumptions that ￿F
j = ￿C





















j =1 = (162￿3 ￿ 256:5￿2 + 195:75￿ ￿ 63:875). This expression










j =1) = (81￿3 ￿ 58:5￿2 + 45￿ ￿ 18), which is strictly positive










i =1=2) = 9(3￿2 ￿ 3￿ + 0:5) > 0 for ￿ > 1=2.
It su¢ ces to take into account the conditions under A.2 as to the feasible values of ￿
to guarantee that all inequalities sub (i)-(iv) hold. Therefore, for ￿L
i = ￿N
i = 0:5 and
￿F
j = ￿C
























Let now introduce the more general hypotheses that ￿L
i = ￿N
i < 0:5 and 1 ￿ ￿C
i > ￿F
j >





i = 1 and the one obtained for ￿L
i = ￿N
i = 1=2, ￿F
j = ￿C
i = 1 are general, i.e. they
hold true for all spillover rates assumed.
First, we examine the ranking of R&D investments when ￿L
i = ￿N
i = 0:5 (and 0:5 < ￿F
j <
￿C






























j )(a ￿ c)(￿F
j ￿ ￿ ￿ 2)
(2￿ ￿ 1)(8 + 2￿F2
j ￿ 8￿F
j ￿ 9￿)
< 0TIMING AND R&D AGREEMENTS 25
due to the SOC for the pro￿t maximization problem when ￿rms compete simultaneously at






















j ) > 0
due to the SOC and the assumed constraints on ￿ (see B.2).














4(a ￿ c)(2 ￿ ￿F
j )(2￿F
j ￿ 1)




















































The same ranking holds also for any value of ￿C
i such that 0:5 < ￿F
j < ￿C
i < 1. This can














The above expression is strictly positive since the term in square brackets at the numerator
is negative (and decreasing in ￿), the second term at the denominator is the SOC for simulta-
neous competition at the investment stage (see B.2), and the third term at the denominator









































for any value of ￿C
i and ￿F
j such that 0:5 < ￿F
j < ￿C
i < 1.
Now we consider the ranking at ￿L
i = ￿N
i = 0 and we let 0:5 < ￿F
j < ￿C




















j ￿) = 0
i⁄ ￿F
j = 1=2. Now, let ￿C
















j =1=2. Moreover, letting ￿F
























j such that 0:5 < ￿F
j < 1. We proceed now by










i =0 could ever be feasible. It
is easily found that the inequality x￿￿
i > x￿￿











i =1=2 at ￿L
i = ￿N
i = 0:5, and ￿F
j > 0:5, combined with the fact
that x￿￿
i is monotonically increasing in ￿L
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The fact that both x￿￿
j and x￿￿
i are monotonically decreasing in ￿L
i = ￿N
i , and that,
conversely, x￿￿
i is monotonically increasing in ￿L
i completes the proof. Figure 5 illustrates
this proposition by means of a numerical example. ￿
Assumptions under Symmetric Spillovers





















Since ￿ 2 [0;1] and xi 2 [0;c], and given that for a ￿rm the worst investment scenario occurs
when x￿
i = 0, ￿ = 0 and x￿
j = c, by (6.13) this yields
(6.15) q
￿




This condition implies that for
a > 2c
a unique interior (positive) Cournot pro￿le of quantities, with associated positive equilibrium
pro￿ts, always exists.






















for any ￿ 2 [0;1]. Firms￿best-replies are obtained instead by setting the derivative of (6.14)
with respect to xi to zero and then solving for xi we get:
xi = gi (xj) =
2(2 ￿ ￿)(a ￿ c + (2￿ ￿ 1)xj)
(9￿ + 8￿ ￿ 2￿2 ￿ 8)
:
Moreover, since for every ￿rm
g
0
i (xj) = ￿




2(2￿ ￿ 1)(2 ￿ ￿)
(8 + 2￿2 ￿ 8￿ ￿ 9￿)TIMING AND R&D AGREEMENTS 27
increasing di⁄erences of ￿i (xi;xj) in (xi;xj) (and then non decreasing best-replies) are im-
plied by ￿ > 1








(2￿ ￿ 1)(2 ￿ ￿):
To guarantee that uniqueness of Nash equilibrium x￿￿ (q￿), a contraction condition would
serve the scope. This condition is respected for g0
i (xj) < 1 when the function is increasing
and for g0
i (xj) > ￿1; when the function is decreasing, thus requiring
(6.16) g
0
i (xj) = ￿
2(2￿ ￿ 1)(2 ￿ ￿)
(8 + 2￿2 ￿ 8￿ ￿ 9￿)
< 1




i (xj) = ￿
2(2￿ ￿ 1)(2 ￿ ￿)
(8 + 2￿2 ￿ 8￿ ￿ 9￿)
> ￿1




2 ￿ 8￿ ￿ 9￿
￿
> ￿2(2￿ ￿ 1)(2 ￿ ￿)




(￿ + 1)(2 ￿ ￿):





Condition (6.17) equals to
(6.19) ￿2(2￿ ￿ 1)(2 ￿ ￿) > ￿
￿
8 + 2￿







(￿ ￿ 1)(￿ ￿ 2):





Therefore, for any ￿ 2 [0;1] the two ￿rms￿investment best-replies gi(xj) are contractions for
￿ > 4
3.
A.3 In order to obtain interior values for the equilibrium investment level x￿under symmet-
ric spillovers and in all simultaneous, cooperative and sequential games, some assumptions
are in order.
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[a ￿ c + (2￿ ￿ 1)xj] > 0
for every xj 2 [0;c]. As a result, for a ￿rm to play xi = 0 is never a best-reply .














(2￿ ￿ 1)(a ￿ c + (2 ￿ ￿)xj + (2￿ ￿ 1)xi)














for every xj 2 [0;c]. It is thus never rational for a ￿rm in a cooperative agreement to play
xi = 0, no matter what the other ￿rm does.













Notice that for ￿ > 1
2 both @￿i(xi;xj)=@xj > 0 and g0






(a ￿ c)(2￿2 + 4 ￿ 6￿ ￿ 3￿)(2 ￿ 2￿2 ￿ 3￿)(2 ￿ ￿)
2(8￿ + 9￿ ￿ 2￿2 ￿ 8)
2 > 0
for ￿ > 4
3, and expression (6.21) guarantees that a ￿rm as a leader will always invest pos-
itively at a sequential equilibrium. Moreover, since the FOC for a follower is the same as
the simultaneous Nash, at the sequential equilibrium both ￿rms will never play a pro￿le.
x￿￿=(0;0). To conclude on the role of assumption A.3, we want to be sure that both ￿rms
will never play their full cost reduction investment (corner solution), and that instead either
their best-replies or their cooperative decisions always lie below their maximum rational level











(a ￿ c) + (2 ￿ ￿)
c
￿ + 1








which is implied by
(6.24) ￿ >
a(2 ￿ ￿)(￿ + 1)
4:5c
:
As a result, for
(6.25) ￿ >
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both simultaneous and sequential investment equilibria are interior and lie below the bound-
ary points, which occurs instead for
(6.26) ￿ ￿


































a ￿ c + (2 ￿ ￿) c









a ￿ c + (2 ￿ ￿) c










Notice that for ￿ < 1
2 (￿ > 1
2) the cooperative constraints on ￿ is less (more) demanding than
the noncooperative constraints. Therefore, the constraint used to avoid full cost reductions
for ￿ > 1
2 is (6.27) while for ￿ < 1
2 in A.3 we can use the contraint (6.24).
Assumptions under Asymmetric Spillovers







[(a ￿ c) + (2 ￿ ￿j)xi + (2￿i ￿ 1)xj]












Substituting in Eq. (6.28) or in Eq. (6.29), x￿
i = 0, x￿
j = c, ￿i = 0 and 0:5 < ￿j < 1, we
obtain that under asymmetric spillovers the condition
a > 2c
is again needed to guarantee an interior Cournot pro￿le of equilibrium quantities, and hence
the strict positivity of equilibrium pro￿ts.
B.2 Given our assumptions on spillovers at the simultaneous noncooperative R&D in-
vestment game, that is, ￿N
i = ￿N
j ￿ 0:5, the SOC of the investment gane do not vary and










Being the RHS of (6.30) decreasing in ￿N
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Note that this condition also guarantees that the SOC of an R&D alliance at the investment










and, being increasing in ￿C
i - and given our assumptions on ￿C






When both ￿rms play simultaneously the investment stage, and given that ￿N
i = ￿N
j ￿ 0:5,





In addition, to guarantee the uniqueness of the sequential equilibrium, the contraction




2(2￿j ￿ 1)(2 ￿ ￿i)
(9￿ + 8￿i ￿ 2￿2
i ￿ 8)
< 1
and given that 0:5 < ￿F




(2 ￿ ￿i)(1 + 2￿j ￿ ￿i):






B.3 First de￿ne as (xi;xj) the point at which the boundary lines given by
xi = c ￿ ￿ixj
xj = c ￿ ￿jxi













[(a ￿ c) + (2 ￿ ￿)xi + (2￿ ￿ 1)xj] ￿ ￿xi = 0
from which the following best-reply
gi (xj) =
2(2 ￿ ￿j)(2(a ￿ c) + (2￿i ￿ 1)xj)
￿
9￿ + 8￿j ￿ 2￿2
j ￿ 8
￿
is obtained. In order to show that this best-reply lies underneath the point (xi;xj), it
su¢ ces to impose that, when the incoming spillover ￿i is greater that 1=2 for at least oneTIMING AND R&D AGREEMENTS 31
￿rm,
@￿i(xi;xj)
@xi < 0. If this condition holds true, then the equilibrium R&D investment pro￿le











(a ￿ c) + (2 ￿ ￿j)
c(1 ￿ ￿i)
1 ￿ ￿i￿j









(a ￿ c) + (2 ￿ ￿j)
c(1 ￿ ￿i)
1 ￿ ￿i￿j
















a(1 ￿ ￿i￿j)(2 ￿ ￿j)
c(1 ￿ ￿i)
:
Since under the sequential equilibrium, 1 > ￿F
j > 0:5 and 0 ￿ ￿L
i ￿ 0:5, the constraint in





which becomes the most stringent one for ￿rm i. The boundary points required for an
interior equilibrium under noncooperative behavior and simultaneous moves were derived in
the previous section. By simply substituting for ￿N












Moreover, since in our assumptions ￿N
i ￿ 0:5, and given that (6.35) is increasing in ￿N
i , the





For a ￿rm entering an R&D alliance, the constraint on ￿ does not vary with respect to
the case with symmetric spillovers, except under the assumption 0:5 < ￿C















Also in this case the constraint on ￿ required under cooperation (eq. 6.38) is the most
stringent and therefore will be the one which has to be imposed. Finally, combining both32 MARCO A. MARINI, MARIA L. PETIT, AND ROBERTA SESTINI.
constraints in B.1 and in B.3 for the sequential investment game, the most demanding
condition on ￿ is:
￿ > 1:
Finallly, in the noncooperative simultaneous investment stage, the same constraint on ￿ has
to be satis￿ed, whilst, under the cooperative case, it is required that:
￿ > 16=9
This is the most stringent condition used in the numerical simulations with asymmetric
spillovers.
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Fig 1 - R&D investment for the leader (boxed line), follower (dotted line) and cooperative ￿rm
(continuous line) for a = 38, c = 18, ￿ = 1:7 and 0 ￿ ￿ ￿ 1
2.
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beta
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for ￿ = 1:7 and 0 ￿ ￿ ￿ 1
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Fig 3 - R&D investments for the leader (boxed line), follower (dotted line) and cooperative ￿rm
(continuous line) for a = 38, c = 18, ￿ = 1:7 and 1
2 ￿ ￿ ￿ 1.
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Fig 5: R&D investment for a leader (dashed line), a follower (solid thick line), a cooperative firm (dotted thick 
line), a non-cooperative firm (solid line) for a=38, c=18,  γ = 2,  , 6 . 0 = F
j β . 8 . 0 = C
i β  
 
Fig 6: payoffs for a leader (dashed line), a follower (solid thick line), a cooperative firm (dotted thick line), 
a non-cooperative firm (solid line) for a=38, c=18,  γ = 2,  , 6 . 0 = F
j β . 8 . 0 = C
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